Theprogramme was in 2008-09 extended to the entire country at the urging of the Congress Party’s youth leader，Rahul Gandhi. The four years in which the MNREGP has been operative have also been professedly，an era of accountability in politics and transparency in bureaucratic functioning. This was the promise inherent in the Right to Information Act （RTI） that was among the first major legislative initiatives of the government that took office in 2004.

As with right to work legislation，RTI had been top priority for numerous civil society groups and left-wing political parties for at least a decade prior. But all campaign efforts had only succeeded in bringing forth a host of state-level laws，none of which had disclosure norms strong enough to be an effective tool of public accountability. The RTI law that was finally adopted by the Union Government in 2005 and given application over all ofIndia，was swiftly recognised as a truly ground-breaking law. There have since been numerous efforts to reassert bureaucratic privilege and whittle down some of its provisions. These have all been defeated by effective civil society mobilisation.

Because of the environment of information transparency in which it has been implemented，the MNREGP enjoys chances of success that were denied its predecessors. Indeed，the processes through which the MNREGP would function，particularly in relation to the public information function，the notification of beneficiaries，and payment of wages，were formulated by civil society actors who had been for years engaged in the RTI campaign，and had identified the precise vulnerabilities in earlier such welfareprogrammes. The MNREGP was in its basic design，programmed to avoid these pitfalls and to deliver maximum value to its intended beneficiaries.

A number of assessments of the MNREGP have been made in its first few years of operation，notably by the economist JeanDreze and his associates.^[1]These have provided an encouraging early portrayal of the impact the programme has had on rural lives and livelihoods，and pointed to vital areas where improvements are necessary. Among the deficiencies，particularly noteworthy are the arbitrary process of fixing wages and the persistence of leakages through corruption. Again，though women have according to official data reviewed by Dreze，been between 40 and 44% of the beneficiaries of the MNREGP countrywide-and no less than 81% in the state of Tamil Nadu-the absence of childcare facilities has been identified as a serious impediment to more meaningful female participation.

Most of these failures as also all others，could be understood as arising from the evasion of bureaucratic accountability，which in turn is made possible by a collusive relationship between administrative staff and local power elites.

A formal evaluation of the MNREGP，conducted by an independent research institution on a mandate from the Planning Commission，has found a similarly mixed picture，with ample grounds for hope. A big worry from the perspective of this exercise，is the failure of the MNREGP to create embedded opportunities for work in the rural areas. Theprogramme has contributed to improved nutrition levels in the target areas. But it has not contributed in durable fashion to long-term work opportunities. This has in turn created two conditions，one of which-the failure to stem the tide of migration towards already choked urban India-is specifically identified as a concern.^[2]In the interests of the long-term viability of the MNREGP，another implication needs to be taken into account：the purchasing power it has created has not been matched by an accummulation of productive assets in the rural areas.

This issue has not yet begun to crease brows within the Indian policy establishment，but it could soon begin to impinge on the viability of the rural jobs growth strategy. For long years sinceliberalisation kicked in as official policy，the Indian government refused to countenance any serious increase in rural welfare spending，simply because the priority was to reduce the budget deficit. The deficit was seen to be the principal cause of the twin evils of national indebtedness and rampant inflation.

There was a viewpoint articulated then，that fiscal investment in rural public worksprogrammes would not engender inflationary pressures，and that the budgetary pressures generated，would if at all，be minor and transient. All through the 1990s，buffer stocks of food with the government and its agencies were a veritable embarrassment of riches. Far in excess of prescribed norms，the carrying costs of these foodgrain stocks were beginning to seriously burden the public exchequer. An argument was advanced that in the circumstances，an increased outlays in rural public works，paid through the issue of foodgrain，would serve the welfare purpose of improving nutritional standards，while being consistent with fiscal pragmatism. Far fro