It is an index ofIndia’s priorities in this respect，that nuclear power is being pursued as the appropriate response to the challenge of climate change. This perception has in turn led to a number of strategic choices，that have deeply impinged on the terms of India’s engagement with the developing world that it once had legitimate claims to lead.

In 2006，the Planning Commission in its mid-term appraisal of the Tenth Five Year Plan （X FYP） put out a rather bleak assessment of the performance of the nuclear power sector and attributed its shortfalls entirely to the failure to discover new sources of minerals that could be processed into nuclear fuel. This was the first that the public at large was hearing of a shortage of atomic minerals in the country，since the story that the Department of Atomic Energy （DAE） had been eagerly fostering since the 1950s was that India had sufficient resources to fuel an ambitious three-stage nuclear powerprogramme that would go from first generation heavy-water reactors，to fast-breeders based on plutonium，to thorium-fuelled reactors，within a few decades.

The Planning Commission summed up its assessment of the prospects of nuclear power，with a telling observation：“Nuclear energy remains an important tool for decarbonising the Indian energy sector”.^[1]

It was far from agreed then that the nuclear fuel cycle was a viable remedy for all the ills of the carbon fuel cycle. But this perception，as also the security anxieties that followedIndia’s nuclear explosive tests of May 1998，ensured that much of India’s international diplomatic effort was devoted in the months that followed，towards building up nuclear energy capacity while retaining sufficient flexibility under international covenants to build up an infinitely flexible arsenal of destructive nuclear weapons.

In July 2005，Prime MinisterManmohan Singh visited the U.S. capital and agreed a joint declaration with U.S. President George Bush that seemingly injected India into the exclusive orbit of recognised nuclear weapons states. This was achieved through a diplomatic contrivance by which India and the U.S. created a point on the international geostrategic map that till then did not exist. The joint statement adopted by Manmohan Singh and George Bush referred to India as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”，which should “acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states”. In effect，this created a special niche exclusively for India，in the limbo between the nuclear haves and have-nots.

Bush’s visit to India in March 2006 was the occasion to put the finishing touches on the accord. If the deal that was agreed then succeeded in calming several of the anxieties suffered by unilateralists within the DAE，its international repercussions were something else. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister warned darkly that the whole Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty （NPT） would “unravel” since it was “only a matter of time before other countries ［began］ to act the same way （as India）.”

India’s bonding with the U.S. also evoked deep suspicions in circles not known to be traditional bastions of hostility. The Guardian in London，for one，commented editorially，that the nuclear agreement between India and the U.S. was “about breaking rules and expecting others to abide by them”. More picturesquely put，it was about “preaching temperance from the barstool”. Indians may well delight in the bargain they had driven，said the newspaper，but there were likely to be some “thoughtful smiles” in Iran and North Korea as the “wider implications” sank in.^[2]

In advance of the Bush visit，theNew York Times observed that despite all the accompanying froth，the presidential passage to India was “built around a bad nuclear deal”. With the deal consummated，the newspaper commented rather acidly，that Bush was turning out to be Iran’s best friend. His adventure in Iraq，launched on flimsy and fabricated evidence，had only transformed that country into a satellite of the Islamic Republic next door. And his deal with India sent “exactly the wrong message” when Washington was scheduled to “refer Iran’s case to the United Nations Security Council for further action”. Iran’s hopes of thwarting a global consensus on its nuclear programme rested on “convincing the rest of the world that the West ［was］ guilty of a double standard on nuclear issues”，commented the New York Times. And in this respect，Bush “might as well have tied a pretty red bow around his India nuclear deal and mailed it as a gift to Tehran”.^[3]

Since then，India went through an arduous route to obtain a nuclear deal tailored to its particular mix of ambitions and anxieties. The Bush administration in the U.S. was well disposed but it took an extra effort to obtain the sanction of the U.S. Congress. This effort involved voting repeatedly aga